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THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE 
DIMENSIONS OF POLICY-BASED 
PERSUASION 
 
Michael R. Smith* 
 
Experts in legal advocacy have long recognized the importance 
of policy arguments in legal persuasion.1 Despite the prevalence of 
policy arguments as tools in legal advocacy, very little scholarship 
has been produced instructing legal advocates on how to write 
effective policy arguments in their briefs. Professor Ellie Margolis 
addressed this oversight in modern advocacy pedagogy in her 2001 
article, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy 
Arguments in Appellate Briefs.2 Professor Margolis’ article takes a 
                                                          
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Written 
Advocacy, University of Wyoming College of Law. I would like to thank the 
George Hopper Faculty Research Fund for providing funds in support of this 
article. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Fajans and Marilyn Walter of 
Brooklyn Law School for the opportunity to participate in the Cognitive Bias 
Symposium and to publish this article as part of the symposium proceedings. I 
would also like to thank the following people and organizations for allowing me 
to present earlier versions of this topic and for the helpful feedback that I 
received at those presentations: Panel organizer Michael Murray and The Legal 
Writing, Reasoning, and Research Section of the AALS, who invited me to 
speak on this topic at the 2011 AALS Annual Meeting; Jan Levine of Duquesne 
University School of Law, who invited me to speak on this topic at the 2011 
Second Colonial Frontier Legal Writing Conference; and Derek Kiernan-
Johnson of The University of Colorado School of Law, who organized a faculty 
colloquium on this topic in 2011. Finally, I would like to thank Tawnya Plumb 
of The University of Wyoming College of Law for her research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL 
WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 349–50 (4th ed. 2010); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL 
WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 6, 310–11 (5th ed. 2010); 
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: 
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 309–13 (6th ed. 2009); HELENE S. SHAPO 
ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 264–70 (5th ed. 2008). 
2 Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy 
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number of important steps toward improving the instruction on 
effective policy argumentation. First, her article explains the types 
of legal issues that give rise to policy arguments and explores the 
general functions that policy arguments serve in the resolution of 
those issues.3 Second, her article reviews in detail various 
substantive categories of policy arguments that previously had 
been explored in jurisprudential scholarship and examines the 
applicability of these categories to legal advocacy.4 Third, 
Professor Margolis, in the most pragmatic part of the article, 
explains how legal advocates can strengthen their policy arguments 
by incorporating citations to persuasive authority, both legal and 
non-legal.5  
Professor Margolis’ article brought much-needed attention to 
the lack of adequate training in policy-based persuasion and 
offered the first formalized instruction in that area.  This article 
builds on Professor Margolis’ work by exploring policy arguments 
from a social science perspective. More specifically, this article 
examines policy-based persuasion from the standpoints of both 
sociology theory and cognitive psychology theory. For legal 
advocates to truly master the skill of policy persuasion, the 
cognitive processes underlying this type of advocacy must be 
explored and understood. Knowing the mental processes involved 
in policy persuasion will enable legal advocates to produce more 
effective arguments based on policy. Moreover, understanding 
how policy arguments fit within the legal system from a 
sociological standpoint will help advocates more fully appreciate 
how policy persuasion differs from other types of legal persuasion. 
This knowledge, too, will allow advocates to employ this strategy 
                                                          
Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV. 59 (2001) [hereinafter 
Margolis, Closing the Floodgates]. For Professor Margolis’ specific discussion 
of the lack of literature on making effective policy arguments, see id. at 60 & 
n.8. 
3 Id. at 65–70. 
4 Id. at 70–79. 
5 Id. at 79–83 (applying to policy-based persuasion her general advice on 
citing non-legal materials in legal arguments, which she explored in her previous 
article, Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal 
Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197 (2000) [hereinafter 
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis].  
 SOCIOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS 37 
more readily and effectively. This article takes the first step in 
exploring policy-based persuasion from both of these social 
science perspectives. 
Part I of this article generally defines the concept of a policy 
argument in terms of sociological principles and cognitive 
psychology principles. This section identifies the unique role 
policy-based persuasion plays in legal decision-making and 
explores the general mental processes underlying this type of 
advocacy. Part II sets out a new categorization scheme for policy 
arguments based on the different broad cognitive processes 
involved in such arguments. In this section, we will see that policy 
arguments, from a cognitive perspective, fall into two broad 
categories: policy arguments that focus primarily on the future, and 
policy arguments that focus on both the present and the future. The 
discussion of these two broad categories of policy arguments sets 
up the final section, Part III, where we explore specific rhetorical 
strategies brief writers can use to improve the effectiveness of their 
policy arguments. Building on the categorization scheme set out in 
Part II and the other principles of social science explored in Part I, 
this final section identifies and examines specific guidelines for 
maximizing the persuasive impact of policy-based advocacy. 
 
I. A SOCIAL SCIENCE DEFINITION OF A POLICY ARGUMENT 
 
A. A Working Example: The Interspousal Immunity Scenario 
 
Before we explore a definition of a policy argument in terms of 
sociological and cognitive principles, I will set out a hypothetical 
example of this type of argument. I will return to this example 
many times in this article to illustrate various points about policy 
arguments. 
Assume that we are lawyers practicing in a jurisdiction that 
recognizes interspousal immunity as a defense to a tort suit.6  
Under interspousal immunity, a spouse as a general matter cannot 
                                                          
6 I have used this interspousal immunity example of a policy argument in 
my prior writings. See MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: 
THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 95–96 (3d ed. 2013). 
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sue the other spouse for injuries resulting from a tort.7  
Jurisdictions that recognize interspousal immunity generally do so 
for two reasons. First, these jurisdictions believe that allowing one 
spouse to sue another would have an embittering effect on the 
marriage due to the adversarial nature of litigation. Thus, in an 
effort to preserve marital harmony, these jurisdictions bar such 
suits.8 Second, these jurisdictions also fear that allowing insured 
spouses to sue each other could lead to rampant insurance fraud. 
Because spouses live together and share finances and living 
expenses, there is a fear that an insured defendant spouse would 
not earnestly defend against the suit because a judgment for the 
plaintiff spouse paid by the defendant’s insurer would actually 
benefit both spouses.9 
Assume further that we are representing a defendant in a tort 
suit and are confronted with an issue of first impression in our 
jurisdiction: whether interspousal immunity applies to bar a suit 
between divorced parties for a tort committed during marriage.  
The plaintiff’s counsel in such a scenario could logically argue that 
interspousal immunity should not bar the suit because the parties 
are no longer spouses. What’s more, the plaintiff’s attorney could 
argue that the reasons underlying the immunity do not apply in this 
situation because (1) there is no longer marital harmony—or even 
a marriage—to protect from the rigors of the adversarial process, 
and (2) insurance fraud is not more likely to occur in this situation 
than in any other arms-length lawsuit because a judgment for the 
plaintiff does not automatically benefit the defendant ex-spouse. 
In response to this logical argument by the plaintiff’s counsel, 
we as the defendant’s counsel could make a policy argument. We 
could argue that allowing this suit would actually encourage 
divorce on a societal scale. The argument would go like this: If the 
court were to hold in this case that interspousal immunity does not 
apply to a suit between divorced spouses for a tort committed 
during marriage, then a spouse injured through the tortious conduct 
                                                          
7 See generally, e.g., Robeson v. Int’l Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 
1991). The discussion of interspousal immunity in the text is based on Georgia 
law. 
8 E.g., id. at 898–99. 
9 E.g., id. 
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of his or her mate in the future could avoid the interspousal 
immunity defense by divorcing before filing suit. An injured 
spouse would be advised by his or her attorney that he or she could 
stay married to the tortfeasor and be barred from recovery or 
divorce the tortfeasor and seek compensation in court. It is not 
unlikely that many injured spouses would choose the option of 
divorce and recovery over the option of marriage and no recovery. 
Thus, from a societal standpoint, such a rule would amount to a 
financial incentive for divorce.   
With this policy argument, we as counsel for the defendant 
spouse could try to persuade the court to hold that suits for torts 
committed during marriage are barred even if the parties divorce 
prior to the initiation of the lawsuit. Our argument would be based 
on the policies of protecting marriage as a social institution and 
avoiding the encouragement of divorce. 
 
B. The Definition of a Policy Argument 
 
Many definitions of a policy argument have been offered in the 
previous literature on the topic.10 I, however, offer a new definition 
of a policy argument in terms of sociological and psychological 
principles: 
 
A policy argument is an argument made by a 
legal advocate to a court that urges the court to 
resolve the issue before it by establishing a new 
rule that advances or protects a particular social 
value implicated by the issue. 
 
To see how I have arrived at this definition, the words of the 
definition must be examined closely. 
 
1. “. . . to a court . . .” 
 
The first part of the definition states as follows: “A policy 
                                                          
10 See authorities cited supra note 1. See also WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE 
TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 51 (2d ed. 2008); Margolis, Closing the 
Floodgates, supra note 2, at 70. 
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argument is an argument made by a legal advocate to a court.” 
This language highlights the fact that the definition is limited to the 
context of legal advocacy in the court system. Policy arguments 
can be made in many different contexts in society, especially in the 
context of the legislative processes of local, state, and federal 
legislatures.11 This article, however, focuses only on the use of 
policy arguments by legal advocates in the context of making legal 
arguments to a court of law. We saw this type of policy argument 
in the interspousal immunity example above, where we discussed 
how the defendant’s attorney could use a policy argument in 
defending his or her client in court. 
 
2. “. . . advances or protects a particular social value . . .” 
 
The second part of the definition that will be examined actually 
comes near the end: “A policy argument is an argument . . . that 
advances or protects a particular social value implicated by the 
issue.”  In terms of cognitive processes, policy arguments persuade 
in a very different manner than other types of legal argumentation. 
Most legal arguments are based on established (and binding) legal 
authority such as statutes, administrative rules, and case law.12 As 
a consequence, these types of legal arguments, from a cognitive 
standpoint, are based largely on principles of formal logic such as 
deductive reasoning13 and analogical reasoning.14 Policy 
                                                          
11 See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, JR., PLAIN 
ENGLISH FOR DRAFTING STATUTES AND RULES 13–19 (2012); ROBERT J. 
MARTINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND RULE 
DRAFTING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 93 (2005); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS 59–68 (1997). 
12 See, e.g., DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 151 (“The relevant rules of 
law . . . provide the framework for your analysis . . . .”); EDWARDS, supra note 
1, at 17 (“The foundation of any legal analysis is the relevant rule of law.”); 
HUHN, supra note 10, at 51 (“There is a fundamental difference between policy 
arguments and the other four types of legal arguments [we have discussed].”); 
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 113 (“Begin [legal analysis] by explaining the 
controlling rule in the jurisdiction in which your problem is located.”). See 
generally, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND 
LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 38–39 (2d ed. 2007). 
13 See authorities cited supra note 12. Professor Gardner’s entire book is 
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arguments, on the other hand, are not based on established legal 
authority15 or on processes of formal logic.  Policy arguments are 
instead based on an appeal to a judge’s value system. 
Consider the interspousal immunity scenario, for example.  In 
that discussion, we assumed that we were legal advocates 
defending a party from an ex-spouse in a tort suit. As a policy 
argument, we argued that if the court held that interspousal 
immunity was inapplicable and that the suit was allowed, the 
precedent established by that ruling would encourage divorce as a 
means of bypassing the interspousal immunity defense in future 
tort suits between spouses. Although this argument seems logical, 
it is not based on principles of formal logic. Instead, it is based on 
an appeal to a judge’s value system and, more specifically, the 
value the judge places on marriage as a social institution. 
The unique nature of policy arguments can best be illustrated 
by comparing it to rule-based, or deductive, reasoning. The formal 
logic of deductive reasoning is predicated on a binding major 
premise.16 Consider this famous example of a formal deductive 
syllogism:17 
 
  
                                                          
devoted to deductive reasoning in the context of legal argument. See generally 
GARDNER, supra note 12. 
14 See, e.g., DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 1, at 101–05; EDWARDS, supra 
note 1, at 106–12; HUHN, supra note 10, at 42–43, 119–22; SHAPO ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 62–64; Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and 
Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 7, 10 
(1996) [hereinafter Edwards, The Convergence]. 
15 Policy arguments can be based on an express statement of policy 
underlying the relevant legal rule. However, this article focuses on the skill of 
crafting an original policy argument rather than the skill of formulating an 
argument based on an existing statement of policy. Professor Margolis also 
recognized the difference between these two types of policy arguments and 
similarly focused her articles on the skill of crafting novel policy arguments. See 
Margolis, Beyond Brandeis, supra note 5, at 211–12; Margolis, Closing the 
Floodgates, supra note 2, at 60. 
16 E.g., GARDNER, supra note 12, at 4, 53–70; Anita Schnee, Logical 
Reasoning “Obviously,” 3 LEG. WRITING 105, 107–08 (1997). 
17 GARDNER, supra note 12, at 5. 
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All men are mortal.                  (MAJOR PREMISE) 
Socrates is a man.                     (MINOR PREMISE) 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.        (CONCLUSION) 
 
In this example, the major premise—All men are mortal—is an 
undeniable truism and serves as the basis for the formal deductive 
logic that follows it.18 Legal arguments based on binding 
established rules also are grounded in the formal logic of deductive 
reasoning. Consider this example from James A. Gardner:19 
 
In order to be enforceable,       (MAJOR PREMISE)  
a contract must be supported  
by consideration.   
The contract between Tim        (MINOR PREMISE) 
and Mary is not supported  
by consideration.                        
Therefore, the contract                   (CONCLUSION) 
between Tim and Mary  
is not enforceable.                            
 
The major premise in this syllogism—that enforceable 
contracts must be supported by consideration—is a rule mandated 
by binding law. Thus, the conclusion is not a product of choice or 
personal preference; it is product of formal deductive reasoning.20 
Policy arguments function quite differently. In the interspousal 
immunity example, there is no binding rule (i.e., major premise) 
that states that a judge must avoid establishing rules that encourage 
divorce. Consequently, the policy argument we explored is not 
based on deductive reasoning flowing from an indisputable major 
premise. Rather, our argument—that the court should rule in our 
favor to avoid encouraging divorce on a societal scale—is based on 
an effort to tap into the judge’s value for marriage as a social 
institution. A judge is not required to protect marriage as an 
institution, and our policy argument is only as strong as the judge’s 
personal commitment to that institution.  
                                                          
18 See id. 
19 Id. at 9. 
20 Id. at 6–8 (discussing the “power of syllogistic reasoning”). 
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To more fully appreciate what this means in terms of 
psychology theory, we must examine the nature of values in 
human cognition. According to renowned social psychologist 
Milton Rokeach, a social value is “an enduring belief that a 
specific . . . end-state of existence is . . . socially preferable to an 
opposite or converse . . . end-state of existence.”21 Thus, in 
Rokeach’s terms, a policy argument is an argument that asks a 
judge to reach a conclusion that advances or protects a specific 
end-state of social existence over the opposite end-state of social 
existence. In terms of the interspousal immunity scenario, our 
policy argument seeks to persuade the judge that an end-state of 
societal existence that preserves marriages (or, at least, does not 
undermine them) is preferable to an end-state of existence in which 
the law actually encourages divorce as a mechanism for avoiding 
interspousal immunity. 
People, however, do not hold their values in a cognitive 
vacuum. Rather, people possess a mental hierarchy of values in 
which their more cherished values are ranked as higher in 
importance than less cherished values.22 As a consequence, if a 
person is forced to make a decision based on values and the issue 
under analysis implicates two or more competing values, the 
higher ranked value or values in the person’s personal value 
hierarchy will generally control the decision.23 Thus, decision-
making based on values is more often not a choice between either 
advancing or not advancing a particular value; it is more often a 
decision about which of the competing values to advance. 
What’s more, a person’s hierarchy of values is personal to him 
or her. The rank order of a person’s values is a product of a 
lifetime of experiences and can—and often does—differ from 
person to person.24 Thus, different people could reach different 
conclusions when forced to decide between the same competing 
                                                          
21 MILTON ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES 5 (1973). Professor 
Rokeach discusses both personal values (like salvation and peace of mind) and 
social values (like world peace and brotherhood). Id. at 5, 7–8. Only social 
values are relevant to our discussion of policy arguments, so the definition of a 
value quoted in the text has been altered accordingly. 
22 Id. at 6, 14. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 6. 
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values. 
The concept of a hierarchical system of values is very 
important to the topic of policy-based persuasion because legal 
issues often implicate two or more competing values. That is, the 
parties on both sides of a legal issue often have policy arguments,25 
and a judge’s task is not to decide whether to advance an 
individual value in isolation, but rather to decide which value 
should be advanced over the other. Let’s again consider our 
interspousal immunity example. As the attorney for the defendant 
in this hypothetical scenario, we argued that the suit between the 
ex-spouses for a marital tort should be barred because to hold 
otherwise would encourage divorce as a means of getting around 
interspousal immunity in future cases. The plaintiff’s counsel, 
however, has competing policy arguments. The attorney for the 
plaintiff can argue that barring the application of interspousal 
immunity in this situation is supported by the policy of citizens 
having access to the courts to resolve conflicts as well as the policy 
supporting a person’s right to be compensated for injuries caused 
by another person.26 Thus, a judge confronted with these 
conflicting policy arguments must decide which end-state of 
existence is preferable: the social state in which the rights of 
legitimate claimants are sacrificed in an effort to preserve 
marriages on a societal scale, or the social state in which the law 
allows a person injured by a spouse to seek compensation in court 
upon divorce despite any incentive to divorce such a law may 
create. 
Furthermore, because people’s value systems (i.e., value 
hierarchies) differ, different judges could reach different 
conclusions on this issue. And it is the personal nature of value 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., Edwards, The Convergence, supra note 14, at 14–15 (discussing 
the competing policy arguments in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1805)); Margolis, Closing the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 65 & n.34. 
26 Both of these values—access to courts and compensation for injury—are 
frequently used in policy-based persuasion. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI 
Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 700, 719 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“[P]ublic policy 
favors granting access to the courts and resolution of conflicts through the 
adversarial system.”); Sam v. Sam, 134 P.3d 761, 768 (N.M. 2006) (“New 
Mexico has a particular interest in providing compensation or access to the 
courts to residents of the state.”). 
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hierarchies that most poignantly differentiates policy-based 
persuasion from other forms of formal legal persuasion. As we saw 
earlier, deductive reasoning based on binding rules and established 
facts results in consistent conclusions. By contrast, arguments 
based on policy could result in different conclusions from different 
judges because each judge may differ in how he or she personally 
ranks the values implicated by the competing policy arguments. 
 
3. “. . . by establishing a new rule . . .” 
 
The third salient part of my definition of a policy argument is 
the language that states, “A policy argument is an argument . . . 
that urges the court to resolve the issue before it by establishing a 
new rule.” It is here where principles of sociology become 
relevant. A policy argument in legal advocacy goes beyond the 
interests of the parties presently before the court and actually urges 
the court to establish a new rule that will apply to society 
generally.27 
In sociology theory, the term institutionalization refers to the 
process by which a value or mode of behavior is embedded into 
and made a part of a social institution.28 The law itself is 
commonly recognized as one of the most important and powerful 
                                                          
27 E.g., Margolis, Closing the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 70 (“[A]ll policy 
arguments share the common attribute of advocating that a proposed legal rule 
will benefit society by advancing a particular social goal or, conversely, that the 
proposed legal rule will cause harm and should not be adopted.”). See also 
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 264–69 (discussing policy arguments in the 
context of “questions of law”). 
28 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Alexander, Analytic Debates: Understanding the 
Relative Autonomy of Culture, in CULTURE AND DEBATES: CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES 1, 5–6 (Jeffery C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 1990); DERIK 
GELDERBLOM, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–8 (2003); PHILLIP SELZNICK, 
LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 5–7, 138–39 (1984); TALCOTT PARSONS ON 
INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION: SELECTED WRITINGS 115–28 (L. H. 
Mayhew ed., 1982); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutional 
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 
341 (1977); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Introduction to THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 14–15 (Walter W. Powell 
and Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
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social institutions.29 In terms of the social institution that is the law 
then, the process of institutionalization would refer to the act or 
process of embedding a value or mode of conduct within a rule of 
law, thereby putting the power of the government behind the 
protection and advancement of that value or mode of conduct, at 
least within the narrow area addressed by the rule.30 
As we discussed previously, policy arguments seek to resolve 
an issue by asking the court to establish a new rule that would 
advance or protect a particular social value. Thus, in sociological 
terms, a policy argument seeks to institutionalize a value by 
encouraging a court to establish a new rule that would protect or 
advance that value. Likewise, if the policy argument is successful, 
the new rule is established for the express purpose of securing the 
                                                          
29 E.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND 
METHOD OF LAW 118 (4th ed. 1981) (“[T]he law [is] a social institution 
[designed] to satisfy social wants.”) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 47 (1954)); Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a 
New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 359 (“Decades of sociolegal 
scholarship have established that law is a social institution.”); Richard A. 
Posner, Foreword to ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 5 (Michael Faure & 
Roger Van deh Bergh eds., 1989) (“Law is a social institution of enormous 
antiquity and importance.”); Donald E. Shelton, Technology and the Judiciary: 
The Promise and the Challenge, 39 JUDGES’ J., no. 1, 2000, at 6, 6 (“The law is a 
social institution and evolves by societal changes, not by its own instance.”). 
30 For general discussions on how the law empowers some values and 
disempowers others, see for example, Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) 
(“Judges are people of violence. Because of the violence they command, judges 
characteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office. 
Confronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that 
this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the rest.”); Christopher P. Gilkerson, 
Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and 
Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 865–66 (1992) (“[The law is] 
both: a social institution through which people tell about their relationships with 
others and with the state; and an authoritative language, or discourse, with the 
power to suppress stories and experiences not articulated in accepted forms.”); 
Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic 
Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623, 1624 (1999) (discussing Cover) 
(“The role of the judge . . . is purely negative. It is ‘jurispathic,’ or law-killing, 
in the sense that the judge will select one of the squalling brood of conflicting 
legal meanings to elevate and to enforce with the violence of the state—and will 
slay the rest.”). 
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value in question. 
Let’s again consider the interspousal immunity example. In 
that example we argued that allowing a person to sue an ex-spouse 
for a tort committed during marriage would encourage divorce in 
the future as a means of getting around interspousal immunity. 
Thus, we argued that the court should establish a new rule that a 
person cannot sue an ex-spouse for a marital tort even if the person 
divorces the potential defendant prior to filing suit. By making this 
argument, we were asking the court to institutionalize within the 
legal institution the value of protecting marriages, at least within 
this narrow context. And if our argument was successful and the 
court established this new rule, the new rule would exist for the 
express purpose of protecting marriage on a societal scale, even at 
the sacrifice of the competing values of compensation for injuries 
and access to the courts. 
This aspect of policy-based persuasion—the aspect that seeks 
the establishment of a new rule of law—is what differentiates 
policy persuasion from a related form of legal persuasion called 
narrative persuasion. Narrative persuasion, or fact-based 
persuasion, occurs when a legal advocate includes facts in his or 
her brief that are not relevant to the legal issue before the court but 
which put the advocate’s client in a favorable light or the opposing 
party in an unfavorable light.31 Narrative persuasion is designed to 
motivate the decision-maker into wanting to rule in favor of the 
advocate’s client or, at least, against the opposing party.32 
Like policy persuasion, narrative persuasion is based on an 
appeal to a judge’s values.33 In narrative persuasion, an advocate 
includes facts that are designed to implicate a value reflected by 
those facts. Unlike policy persuasion, however, narrative 
persuasion does not seek to have that value embedded into a new 
                                                          
31 E.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Competing Stories: A Case Study of the Role of 
Narrative Reasoning in Judicial Decisions, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J. 
ALWD 99, 102 (2012) (citing NEUMANN, supra note 1, at 309–11; Christopher 
Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. LEGAL 
WRITING 53 (2008)). See also, e.g., SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 414–19.  
32 NEUMANN, supra note 1, at 309–11; Chestek, supra note 31, at 102. 
33 E.g., Edwards, The Convergence, supra note 14, at 11 (“Narrative 
reasoning evaluates a litigant’s story against cultural narratives and the moral 
values and themes these narratives encode.”). 
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rule of law. Rather, the facts are included to persuade and 
influence the judge separate and apart from the law applicable to 
the issue before the court.34 
The case of Springham v. Kordek35 highlights the similarities 
and differences between policy-based persuasion and narrative 
persuasion. In my prior writings, I summarized the facts of 
Springham as follows:36 
In Springham, the adult surviving children of an 
abandoned mother sued their estranged father after 
he attempted, following his wife’s death, to sell the 
family home and retain all of the proceeds. The 
facts of the case showed that the father had 
abandoned his wife and four minor children years 
earlier and that the children, upon reaching 
adulthood, helped their mother make the mortgage 
payments on her home. The mortgage on the home 
was in the names of both the mother and the father; 
thus, the children’s efforts to avoid foreclosure 
benefitted both their mother and their absentee 
father. After the mother died, the father reentered 
the scene to claim the property and to sell it. The 
children then filed suit to enjoin the father’s sale of 
the property and to impose a lien on the property as 
subrogees for the mortgage payments they had 
made. 
 The trial court ruled in favor of the father, and 
the children appealed. The main issue on appeal 
was whether the children had gained rights as 
subrogees or whether they had acted as mere 
“volunteers” or “intermeddlers,” who were not 
entitled to rights of subrogation. The appellate court 
reversed the trial court and held that the children did 
acquire lien rights under Maryland’s law of 
                                                          
34 NEUMANN, supra note 1, at 309–11; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 414–
19; Chestek, supra note 31, at 102. 
35 462 A.2d 567 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983). 
36 I have used the Springham case in the past to illustrate narrative 
persuasion. See SMITH, supra note 6, at 92–94. 
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subrogation.37 
During the appeal, the children’s attorney, in addition to 
arguing the relevant law of subrogation, had the opportunity to 
engage in narrative persuasion by including facts that portrayed the 
father as being ungrateful for the children’s efforts in saving his 
home from foreclosure. By including and highlighting facts 
regarding the father’s surprisingly callous attitude toward the 
children, the attorney could activate the appellate judges’ values 
for gratefulness and appreciativeness and, in so doing, tacitly 
motivate the court to root against the father in the final resolution 
of the legal issue. 
The appellate briefs for the Springham case are not available 
on electronic databases, so we can’t know for sure if the attorney 
for the children engaged in this type of persuasion in the brief to 
the court. What we do know is that the court was significantly 
motivated by these facts to view the father in a less-than-favorable 
light. In fact, genuine animus toward the father is reflected in 
several places in the court’s published opinion.  Judge Solomon 
Liss began his opinion for the court with a biting literary reference 
to Shakespeare’s King Lear: 
Shakespeare, in his tragedy “King Lear,” portrayed 
the bitterness of a parent plagued by ungrateful 
children. In Act I, IV 283, Lear laments, 
Ingratitude, thou marble hearted 
fiend, 
More hideous, when thou shows’t 
thee in a child, 
Than the sea monster. 
And again, in Act I, IV 312, Lear cries out, 
How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it 
is 
To have a thankless child. 
This case illustrates that ingratitude is not the sole 
prerogative of ungrateful children.38 
Later in the opinion, the court addresses the father’s claim that 
the children acted as intermeddlers who “interfered with his 
                                                          
37 Id. at 92–93. 
38 Springham, 462 A.2d at 568. 
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liability for the debt.”39 Responding to this claim with incredulity 
and dismay toward the father, the opinion states: 
The appellee perhaps gives his children less credit 
than they deserve.  It is obvious that they knew that 
by making the mortgage payments they protected 
not only their mother but their father as well.  To 
suggest that the father has shown less than the 
minimum of gratitude which might be expected is to 
state the obvious.40 
It comes as no surprise to the readers of the opinion that the 
court, in the end, decided against the father and in favor of the 
children’s rights as subrogees.41 To the extent that the law of 
subrogation was ambiguous on the issues before the court, it is safe 
to assume that the court was motivated by the facts of the case to 
resolve those ambiguities in favor of the children. 
While the Springham case shows how narrative persuasion can 
be a powerful tool of advocacy, it also demonstrates how narrative 
persuasion differs from policy persuasion. The attorney for the 
children in this case had the opportunity to use facts to activate 
values favorable to his clients. However, the attorney was not in a 
position to seek to institutionalize those values in a new rule of 
law. That is, the attorney could not advocate that there should be a 
separate rule under the law of subrogation for subrogors who act in 
an ungrateful manner. The father’s conduct was not legally 
relevant to the issues of subrogation law before the court, and the 
court did not expressly rule in the children’s favor based on the 
father’s ingratitude. Rather, these facts worked behind the scenes 
to motivate the court to rule against the father. 
Policy-based persuasion, in contrast, uses values in a more 
overt manner. A policy argument not only activates a judge’s 
values, but also asks the judge to institutionalize those values in a 
new rule of law. Thus, while both policy-based persuasion and 
narrative persuasion rely on an appeal to values, they differ 
dramatically from a sociological standpoint. Only in policy-based 
persuasion does an advocate seek to create new law in an effort to 
                                                          
39 Id. at 570. 
40 Id. at 570 n.3. 
41 Id. at 458–59. 
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advance or protect the implicated values. 
Further blurring the line between policy-based persuasion and 
narrative persuasion is the fact that a single value can serve as the 
basis for both types of advocacy. Consider, for example, the value 
of fairness. Fairness commonly serves as the basis for narrative 
persuasion, as advocates often have an opportunity to incorporate 
in their briefs facts that may not be relevant to the legal issue 
before the court but which nevertheless demonstrate the unfairness 
of the opposing party’s conduct or position. We can see the use of 
the value of fairness in narrative persuasion in the Springham case 
discussed above. While the court chose to characterize the father’s 
behavior toward his children in terms of the more specific concept 
of ungratefulness, the court could have just as easily described the 
father’s behavior in terms of the more general concept of 
unfairness. To be sure, the father in Springham acted unfairly when 
he ungratefully sought to divest his children of any interest in the 
family home after they had single-handedly saved the home from 
foreclosure. And while the unfairness of the father’s conduct was 
not relevant to the issues of subrogation law facing the Springham 
court, these facts and the general value of fairness they invoked 
worked behind the scenes to motivate the court to rule against the 
father on the real legal issue presented in the case. 
The value of fairness, however, can also underlie policy-based 
persuasion. Consider, for example, the case of Ahtna Tene Nene v. 
Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game.42 One of the issues in the Ahtna 
case was whether a pro se litigant (named Manning) who had 
graduated from law school but who had not become a member of 
the Alaska state bar could collect attorney fees for his own work in 
the litigation.43 The party opposing the award of attorney’s fees 
had the opportunity to argue, in addition to other arguments, a 
policy argument based on fairness: that it would be unfair to allow 
a person to take advantage of the benefits of being a lawyer when 
that person is not subject to the burdens associated with being a 
lawyer.44 The Alaska Supreme Court found the policy of fairness 
                                                          
42 288 P.3d 452 (Alaska 2012). 
43 Id. at 461–63. 
44 See Brief of Appellant at 10–11, Ahtna Tene Nene v. Alaska Dept. of 
Fish & Game, 288 P.3d 452 (Alaska 2012) (Nos. S-13968, S-14297), 2011 WL 
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to be persuasive and expressly included it as one of the court’s 
rationales for its holding that pro se law graduates who are not 
members of the state bar cannot collect attorney’s fees: 
Moreover, the policy rationales for denying fee 
awards to lay pro se litigants apply equally to law 
school graduates who are not licensed to practice. 
 . . . 
[Manning] does not pay bar dues . . ., 
is not subject to the Alaska Rules of 
Professional Conduct, is not subject 
to the Alaska Bar Rules, does not 
maintain a year round legal staff . . . 
or law office . . ., does not carry legal 
malpractice insurance, does not have 
an IOLTA account [Interest on 
Lawyers Trust Account], does not 
provide pro bono services to the 
indigent, is not available for 
Administrative Rule 12 legal 
assignments, and does not serve on 
discipline, fee arbitration, or other 
committees or volunteer programs 
within the Alaska Bar Association. 
Allowing Manning to reap the benefits of being 
a lawyer, including the ability to recover fees, 
without taking on the obligations and 
responsibilities of being a lawyer is fundamentally 
unfair.45 
This quote shows that the Alaska Supreme Court expressly 
based its holding, at least in part, on the value of fairness. 
Consistent with policy-based persuasion and policy-based 
decision-making, the value of fairness did not merely operate 
behind the scenes in Ahtna. Instead, the court institutionalized the 
value of fairness as a component of the court’s newly established 
                                                          
7449957. Although the attorney did not argue fairness expressly, he did argue 
the facts that served as the basis for the court’s ruling in this regard. See id. 
45 Ahtna, 288 P.3d at 462–63 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting the superior court). 
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rule of law. Thus, the Ahtna case demonstrates that policy 
arguments can be based on the value of fairness.46 More important 
for the present discussion, however, the juxtaposition of the Ahtna 
case with the Springham case shows how policy-based persuasion 
based on the value of fairness differs substantially from narrative 
persuasion based on the value of fairness. 
 
II. TYPES OF POLICY ARGUMENTS 
 
 The previous literature on policy arguments in legal 
advocacy discusses a four-category organizational scheme.47 This 
categorization is based on the types of values implicated by policy 
arguments.  Professors Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter, and 
Elizabeth Fajans offer this summary: 
Policy arguments can be categorized in many ways, 
but one useful system is to divide them into four 
basic groups: normative arguments, that is, 
arguments about shared values and goals that the 
law should promote; economic arguments, which 
look at the economic consequences of a rule; 
institutional competence arguments, that is 
structural arguments about the proper relationship 
of courts to other courts and courts to other 
branches of government; and judicial administration 
arguments, arguments about the practical effects of 
a ruling on the administration of justice.48 
This list of types of policy arguments is useful in brief writing 
                                                          
46 But see EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 6 (suggesting that the value of fairness 
is applicable to narrative persuasion only); Edwards, The Convergence, supra 
note 14, at 16–17 (same). 
47 EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 94–95; SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 264–
69; Margolis, Closing the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 70–79. Before these 
categories of policy arguments were discussed in the context of legal persuasion, 
they were originally discussed in the context of jurisprudence scholarship by 
Professor Duncan Kennedy and later by Professor James Boyle. See, e.g., 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976); James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1003, 1055–60 (1985).  
48 SHAPO ET AL., supra note 1, at 264. 
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as a reminder of the types of arguments legal advocates should 
consider in crafting their briefs. However, this organizational 
scheme is less helpful from a cognitive psychology standpoint 
because there is no evidence that any one of these categories is 
cognitively more persuasive than any other. Thus, I will offer an 
alternative organizational scheme for policy arguments from a 
cognitive perspective. 
In terms of cognitive processes, policy arguments can be 
divided into two main categories: (1) Policy Arguments Based on 
Future Implications Only, and (2) Policy Arguments Based on 
Present and Future Implications. The significance of these 
categories will become evident in Part III of this article, where we 
will explore strategies for improving the effectiveness of policy-
based persuasion. 
 
A. Policy Arguments Based on Future Implications Only 
 
The first category covers policy arguments that are designed to 
protect the implicated social value in the future, but which are not 
designed to protect that value in the case presently before the court.  
These types of policy arguments tacitly recognize that it is too late 
to protect the value in the present case and instead seek to protect 
that value in the future through the establishment of a new rule of 
law.  Let’s consider some examples: 
 
1. The interspousal immunity example (from the defendant’s 
perspective) - As you will recall, previously I posited the 
hypothetical issue of whether interspousal immunity should bar a 
suit between divorced spouses for a tort committed during the 
marriage of the parties. In that context, we first explored a policy 
argument for the defending party. As attorneys for the defendant, 
we argued that the court should bar this type of suit because if it 
were allowed, divorce would be encouraged in the future as a 
means of getting around interspousal immunity.49 This argument, 
in the resolution of the hypothetical present case, advocates for a 
new rule that would protect marriages in the future. Obviously, this 
argument is not designed to protect the marriage of the parties in 
                                                          
49 See supra Part I.A. 
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the present case. The parties have already divorced, and there is 
nothing the court could do to prevent that short of traveling back in 
time. Thus, this policy argument focuses on the future only; it asks 
the court to resolve the present case by establishing a rule that 
would protect the institution of marriage in the future. 
 
2. Klinger v. Adams County School District and the definition 
of “expenses” - The second example of a “future implications 
only” policy argument comes from the case of Klinger v. Adams 
County School District. 50 In Klinger, a teacher violated a Colorado 
statute that requires public school teachers to give the employing 
school district written notice of termination at least 30 days prior to 
the beginning of a new school year.51 If a teacher gives late notice, 
the statute authorizes the school district to withhold from the 
teacher’s final paycheck the “expenses” incurred by the district in 
hiring a replacement teacher.52 After Ms. Klinger gave a late notice 
of termination to the Adams County School District, the District 
asked some salaried employees to allocate some of their time to the 
task of hiring a replacement for Ms. Klinger.53 After a replacement 
teacher was hired, the School District determined the monetary 
value of the reallocated salaried-employees’ time and deducted that 
amount from Ms. Klinger’s final paycheck.54 The issue addressed 
by the Colorado Supreme Court in this case was whether the term 
“expenses” in the statute includes only out-of-pocket expenditures 
or whether it also includes the monetary value of reallocated 
salaried-employees time.55 
In addressing this issue, the attorneys for the School District 
argued that the term “expenses” should be interpreted to include 
employee time for policy reasons. The attorneys argued that the 
statutory term should be interpreted broadly—i.e., that it should 
include more expenses rather than less—so that the provision 
would serve as a strong deterrent against teachers giving late 
                                                          
50 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006). 
51 Id. at 1029–30 (discussing COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-202(2)(a) (2005)). 
52 Id. at 1029. 
53 Id. at 1030. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. 
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notices of termination in the future.56 The attorneys for the School 
District explained that late notices and the resulting late hiring 
processes undermine the state’s school districts’ ability to offer 
quality education to students in several ways: first, late hiring 
involves a depleted pool of less-qualified applicants; second, late 
hiring distracts the other teachers from preparing for the new 
school year; and third, teachers hired late in the process are less 
prepared for the start of new school year.57 
The School District’s policy argument can be characterized as 
a “future implications only” policy argument because the 
argument’s goal of protecting education applies to the future only.  
Obviously, a broad interpretation of the statutory word “expenses” 
could not deter Ms. Klinger herself from giving a late notice of 
termination. She had already given a late notice, and the 
consequences of that late notice were already incurred by the 
School District. Thus, the School District’s policy argument did 
not seek to protect the educational process from Ms. Klinger’s 
conduct specifically; the argument called for the court to resolve 
Ms. Klinger’s case by establishing a new rule that would protect 
education in the future. 
 
3. Smith v. United States and “using a firearm” - The case of 
Smith v. United States58 involved a federal criminal statute that 
enhances a criminal’s punishment if he or she “uses . . . a firearm” 
during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.59 In that case, the 
defendant, Smith, used a firearm as an item of barter when he 
attempted to trade the firearm to an undercover officer in exchange 
for drugs.60 The issue before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the statutory phrase “uses . . . a firearm” applies only to 
                                                          
56 Answer Brief for Petitioner at 11–15, Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006) (No. 04SC724), 2005 WL 2211410. 
57 This argument is made most clearly in the amicus brief of the Colorado 
School Board Association. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Colorado Association of 
School Boards in Support of Respondents at 6–8, Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006) (No. 04SC724), 2005 WL 2211411. 
58 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
59 Id. at 226–27 (emphasis added) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) 
(1990)).  
60 Id. at 225–26. 
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using a firearm as a weapon or whether it also includes using a 
firearm as an item of barter.61  The prosecuting attorney argued, 
among other things, that the phrase in question should be 
interpreted broadly for the policy reasons of citizen safety and 
violence prevention. More specifically, the prosecuting attorney 
argued that the presence of a gun at a drug deal injects an element 
of dangerousness into the situation even if the gun is there as an 
item of trade. Consequently, the prosecuting attorney argued that 
the phrase “use a firearm” should be interpreted broadly to 
discourage drug dealers from taking firearms to drug 
transactions.62 The Supreme Court agreed with the prosecution and 
upheld Smith’s conviction under the firearms statute.63 
The prosecutor’s policy argument in Smith was a “future 
implications only” policy argument. The prosecutor argued that the 
Court should uphold Smith’s conviction in order to set a precedent 
that would discourage future behavior. The argument was not 
designed to deter Smith himself from taking a gun to a drug 
transaction. He had already done that. Thus, the argument’s goal 
was to have the Court resolve the present case based on the 
precedent the case could establish and the impact that precedent 
would have on the future. 
 
4. The “closing the floodgates” example - The final example of 
a “future implications only” policy argument highlights how 
common and widespread these types of policy arguments are in 
legal advocacy. I refer to the popular “floodgates of litigation” 
policy argument.64 As Professor Margolis explains, 
[t]his argument asserts that the proposed rule, if 
adopted, will inundate the court with lawsuits. This 
may occur because the proposed rule is confusing, 
overly broad, or the problem it addresses is 
                                                          
61 Id. at 225, 227. 
62 See Brief for the United States at 29–30, Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 
223 (1993) (No. 91-8674), 1992 WL 547234. 
63 Smith, 508 U.S. at 238–41. 
64 The popularity of the “floodgates of ligation” policy argument is reflected 
in Professor Margolis’ article, both in the title and in her statement that “[t]his 
argument is much overused.” See Margolis, Closing the Floodgates, supra note 
2, at 59, 73 n.74. 
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extremely common. According to this argument, the 
“flood” of litigation would overwhelm the courts 
and lead to inefficient use of the courts’ valuable 
time and resources.65 
The “floodgates of litigation” policy argument is also a “future 
implications only” policy argument. When an advocate makes this 
argument, the advocate is encouraging a court to issue a ruling that 
will prevent a flood of litigation in the future. Obviously, the court 
cannot prevent the present litigation because it already exists. 
Thus, the argument asks the court to establish a rule that will 
protect judicial resources from future cases only. 
 
B. Policy Arguments Based on Present and Future Implications  
 
The second category of policy arguments covers policy 
arguments that apply both to the case presently before the court as 
well as to future cases on the same issue. As we saw, policy 
arguments that fall under the previous category focus exclusively 
on the precedent that the present case can establish and the 
potential impact of that precedent in the future. Policy arguments 
that fall under this second category function very differently; they 
focus on both the present and the future. In terms of the present, 
these types of policy arguments explain how a particular social 
value dictates a result in the case presently before the court. In 
terms of the future, these types of policy arguments rely on the 
idea that a favorable ruling in the present case will establish a 
precedent that will continue to protect the implicated social value 
going forward. Here are three examples: 
 
1. The interspousal immunity example (from the plaintiff’s 
perspective) - In the previous section, we saw how the policy 
argument for the defendant in the interspousal immunity example 
qualifies as a “future implications only” policy argument.66 By 
contrast, the policy arguments for the plaintiff on that same issue 
can be characterized as “present and future implications” policy 
arguments. Recall that the issue we explored in this hypothetical 
                                                          
65 Id. at 73. 
66 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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scenario was whether interspousal immunity should bar a suit 
between divorced spouses for a tort committed during the marriage 
of the parties. In this context, we explored two policy arguments 
that the plaintiff could raise. First, from the perspective of the 
plaintiff, we argued that the immunity doctrine should not apply 
and the suit should be allowed because of the policy that favors 
allowing citizens to have access to the court system to resolve 
grievances. Second, we argued that the suit should be allowed 
because of the policy that supports compensating a person who is 
injured by the tortious conduct of another.67 
Unlike with “future implications only” policy arguments, these 
arguments for the plaintiff have implications for the present case as 
well as future cases. Clearly, the present plaintiff would like access 
to the courts to seek compensation for his or her injuries. And if a 
court was persuaded by these policy arguments and held that a 
divorced spouse could sue an ex-spouse for a martial tort, this 
ruling would enable the present plaintiff to do just that. In terms of 
the future, the ruling would serve as a precedential rule of law that 
would apply to future cases. This new rule would institutionalize 
the values of access to the courts and compensation for the injured 
in this limited context and would guarantee the right to sue in like 
cases in the future. Thus, whereas the “future implications only” 
policy arguments we explored in the previous section sought to 
protect or advance a social value in the future only, “present and 
future implications” policy arguments have relevance and 
applicability to the case at hand as well as to future cases on the 
same issue. 
 
2. Ahtna Tene Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game - Earlier, 
we discussed the Ahtna case, where the issue before the Alaska 
Supreme Court was whether attorney fees could be awarded to a 
pro se litigant who graduated from law school but who was not a 
member of the state bar.68 In that example, we explored a policy 
argument raised by the party advocating against the attorney’s fees. 
That policy argument was based on the value of fairness and 
asserted that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to allow a person 
                                                          
67 See supra text accompanying note 26. 
68 See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
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to collect fees as an attorney when that person is not subject to the 
duties and responsibilities of bar membership.69 This policy 
argument can also be characterized as a “present and future 
implications” policy argument. The policy argument was used to 
convince the court to establish a rule that denied attorney’s fees to 
the law graduate in that case.70 The ruling in the Ahtna case, 
however, also established a precedent that will prevent the 
recovery of attorney’s fees by similarly-situated law graduates in 
the future. Thus, the policy argument had implications on the case 
presently before the court as well as on future cases involving the 
same issue. 
 
3. Constitutional civil rights cases and Illinois v. Caballes71  - 
Most policy arguments in cases involving constitutional civil rights 
can also be classified as “present and future implications” policy 
arguments. This is true because most issues of constitutional rights 
are resolved based on policy considerations,72 and the policy 
considerations are typically applicable to the present litigants as 
well as future similarly-situated litigants. By way of example, let’s 
consider the case of Illinois v. Caballes.  
In Caballes, a criminal defendant sought to have evidence of 
illegal drugs found in his automobile excluded from his 
prosecution based on the assertion that it was obtained during an 
illegal search.73 The facts showed that police pulled Caballes over 
for a traffic violation and, without suspicion of drug use, used a 
drug-sniffing dog from outside the automobile to smell for drugs 
within the automobile.74 The dog detected the scent of drugs, and a 
subsequent physical search of the interior of the automobile 
revealed drugs.75 The issue before the United States Supreme 
                                                          
69 See id. 
70 See id. (citing Ahtna, 288 P.3d at 462–63). 
71 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
72 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of 
Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1540 (2000) (“The Bill of Rights is rife with 
terms of uncertain meaning that inescapably demand political value judgments 
in interpretation.”). 
73 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. 
74 Id. at 406. 
75 Id. 
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Court was whether the use of a drug-sniffing dog from outside of a 
vehicle when there is no suspicion of drug use amounts to a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches.76 
In addition to arguing by analogy based on prior Fourth 
Amendment precedent, the parties for both sides had the ability to 
argue policy. The policy underlying the prosecution’s position, as 
is true for all unreasonable search cases, was the value of 
protecting society from criminal behavior.77 The policy for the 
defense, not surprisingly, was based on the values of privacy and 
citizen protection from governmental intrusion.78 The policy 
arguments for both the defense and the prosecution can be 
classified as “present and future implications” policy arguments 
because they had relevance to Caballes’ case specifically as well as 
to future cases on the same issue. For example, from the 
defendant’s perspective, the search infringed upon Caballes’ 
privacy rights, and a favorable decision by the Court would protect 
those rights by excluding the incriminating evidence from 
Caballes’ prosecution. The favorable ruling would also protect the 
value of privacy in the future by establishing a precedent that 
would discourage police officers from this type of conduct. 
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the search was legal 
and that the evidence obtained in the search could be used in 
Caballes’ prosecution.79 Thus, the policy of protecting society 
against criminal conduct had implications on the case at bar, as the 
evidence was used to convict Caballes and society was thereby 
protected from his conduct. The policy also applies to the future 
through the precedent that the Caballes case established.  In fact, a 
case with nearly identical facts arose only two months later in the 
                                                          
76 Id. at 407. 
77 See, e.g., id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 
(1984)) (“We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be 
deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the 
possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”). 
78 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent at 13, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405 (2005) (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 2097415 (“The lack of physical intrusion 
into a motorist’s trunk makes a dog sniff less intrusive than an ordinary search, 
but it does not mean that the sniff invades no privacy interest.”). 
79 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. 
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Seventh Circuit. Not surprisingly, that case, United States v. 
Johnson,80 was decided in favor of the prosecution based on the 
new rule established in Caballes. 
As Caballes demonstrates, policy arguments in cases involving 
constitutional civil rights almost always have relevance to the 
instant case as well as to the future. Thus, policy arguments in 
these types of cases can readily be characterized as “present and 
future implications” policy arguments. The frequency of 
constitutional civil rights cases alone demonstrates how common 
this second category of policy arguments is in legal advocacy.  
 
III. MAXIMIZING THE PERSUASIVE IMPACT OF POLICY ARGUMENTS 
IN LEGAL ADVOCACY 
 
The first two parts of this article explained the general nature 
of policy-based persuasion in terms of sociology theory and 
cognitive psychology theory. This part explores specific strategies 
legal advocates can employ to improve the effectiveness of their 
policy arguments in their briefs. As we will see, social science 
theory, especially cognitive psychology theory, offers many 
insights into the human mind that can help advocates maximize the 
persuasive impact of policy arguments. The strategies discussed in 
this section are organized around the four most important cognitive 
processes relevant to policy-based persuasion: (A) the fear of 
future loss; (B) the assessment of probability; (C) the assessment 
of importance; and (D) memory. 
 
A. Take Advantage of the Fear of Future Loss 
 
Several cognitive phenomena, when considered together, 
suggest that policy arguments that focus primarily on future 
implications are more persuasive than policy arguments that focus 
on present implications. The processes at play here are the 
following: 
 
 The Uncertainty Effect: The uncertainty effect refers to 
                                                          
80 123 F.App’x 240, 240 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At argument, Johnson could not 
distinguish this case from Caballes, and neither can we.”). 
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the tendency of people, when deciding between 
alternatives, to avoid options that reflect uncertainty.81   
 
 Status Quo Bias: Status quo bias refers to the strong 
tendency of people to prefer the status quo over 
change.82 
 
 The Mere Exposure Effect: The mere exposure effect 
refers to the tendency of people to prefer things with 
which they are familiar over things with which they are 
less familiar.83  This effect is similar to status quo 
bias.84 
 
All three of these processes include an element of fear. The 
uncertainty effect, for example, reflects a fear of uncertainty and 
unpredictability. Likewise, the related processes of status quo bias 
and the mere exposure effect reflect fears of change and 
unfamiliarity, respectively. 
Fear is also integral to policy-based persuasion. As we 
explored in Part I, policy arguments are based on the assertion that 
a decision for the advocate will result in the betterment of society, 
a societal gain if you will. The corollary to this notion is that the 
                                                          
81 See, e.g., ROLF DOBELLI, THE ART OF THINKING CLEARLY 239–41, 350 
(Nicky Griffin trans., 2013); Uri Gneezy et al., The Uncertainty Effect: When a 
Risky Prospect is Valued Less than Its Worst Possible Outcome, 121 Q. J. ECON. 
1283 (2006). 
82 See, e.g., DOBELLI, supra note 81, at 242–44; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 304–05 (2011); Shane Frederick, Automated Choice 
Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 555 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); 
W. Samuelson & R. Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK 
AND UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
83 See, e.g., Robert F. Bornstein & Catherine Craver-Lemley, Mere 
Exposure Effect, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND 
BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 215, 215–34 (Rudiger F. Pohl 
ed., 2004); D. E. Berlyne, Novelty, Complexity, and Hedonic Value, 8 
PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 279 (1970); Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and 
Affect: Overview and Meta-analysis of Research, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 
(1989); Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Motivational Effects in the Mere Exposure 
Paradigm, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 479 (1996). 
84 See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 83, at 265–89. 
64 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
failure to implement the advocate’s policy will result in a societal 
loss. Thus, underlying all policy arguments is a fear of loss to 
society and a corresponding desire to avoid that loss. 
Recall that in Part II of this article we explored two primary 
types of policy arguments: “future implications only” policy 
arguments and “present and future implications” policy arguments. 
While both of these types of policy arguments invoke a fear of 
loss, the three cognitive phenomena discussed above suggest that 
policy arguments that warn against future loss are more persuasive 
than policy arguments that warn against immediate loss. For one 
thing, “future implications only” policy arguments, by definition, 
focus on the future and, as such, trigger the fear of uncertainty and 
unpredictability. The consequences warned of in a “future 
implications only” policy argument will occur only in the future 
and, thus, are imbued with the uncertainty that accompanies all 
future predictions.  By contrast, “present and future implications” 
policy arguments focus on consequences that will occur in the 
present case as well as in the future. The “present” consequences 
will occur immediately upon the judge’s decision and, thus, are 
known and predictable.  And even though the ruling, as precedent, 
would also impact the future, the future impact is predictable as 
well because it is the same as the present impact. Thus, the 
uncertainty effect suggests that policy arguments that warn of 
future loss only are more motivating and persuasive than policy 
arguments that are based on an immediate impact. 
Status quo bias and the mere exposure effect also suggest that 
in the context of policy-based persuasion, the fear of future loss is 
more persuasive than the fear of immediate loss. The future 
negative consequences warned of in a “future implications only” 
policy argument represent more change and unfamiliarity than the 
negative consequences underlying a “present and future 
implications” policy argument. The negative consequences of a 
“present and future implications” policy argument are more readily 
envisioned by and comprehendible to a judge because those 
consequences would occur immediately upon the judge’s decision. 
Conversely, the negative consequences underlying a “future 
implications only” policy argument are less appreciable to a judge 
because those consequences would occur only in the more distant 
future. By virtue of their temporal proximity, the consequences of 
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a “present and future implications” policy argument seem more 
natural and familiar than consequences that would take place only 
in the future. Moreover, because future potential consequences 
seem less familiar, they represent a more dramatic change from the 
status quo than more easily envisioned changes that would take 
effect immediately. 
By way of example, let’s again consider the interspousal 
immunity hypothetical.  In that example, we considered the issue 
of whether interspousal immunity should bar a suit between 
divorced spouses for a tort committed while the parties were 
married. As you will recall, the defendant’s policy argument on 
this issue was a “future implications only” policy argument: that 
allowing this suit would establish a precedent that would 
encourage divorce in the future as a means of avoiding interspousal 
immunity. One the other side of the issue, the plaintiff had “present 
and future implications” policy arguments: that the suit should be 
allowed to protect citizens’ rights to compensation and access to 
the courts. 
The phenomenon of the uncertainty effect suggests that most 
judges would be more motivated to avoid the unpredictable future 
consequences underlying the defendant’s policy argument than 
they would be to avoid the more predictable immediate 
consequences underlying the plaintiff’s policy argument. Status 
quo bias and the mere exposure effect suggest the same thing. The 
social state of an ex-spouse being denied access to the court 
system, which would happen immediately upon the court’s ruling 
to that effect, is easily imagined and tangible to a judge. And even 
though such a ruling for the defendant would also impact the 
future, the future impact is also imaginable because it is the same 
as the present impact: the denial of court access to legitimate 
claimants. By contrast, the prospect of a future social state in 
which the law encourages divorce seems like an unfamiliar, scary, 
and distant change to the social landscape. And this prospect is 
even scarier because the impact would occur in the future only.  
Because the threatened impact is not relevant to the instant case, 
the impact is left only to the imagination. Thus, these cognitive 
phenomena suggest that in the context of the interspousal 
immunity example, the defendant’s “future implications only” 
policy argument would be more persuasive to a judge than the 
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plaintiff’s “present and future implications” policy arguments 
because most people would be more motivated to avoid the future 
negative consequence than the immediate negative consequences. 
Given a choice then, it seems that advocates would be better 
off trying to construct their policy arguments as “future 
implications only” policy arguments rather than “present and 
future implications” policy arguments. Sometimes, however, an 
advocate does not have a choice between these two types of policy 
arguments because some legal issues lend themselves only to 
“present and future implications” policy arguments. When this is 
the case, an advocate would be well advised in arguing the 
“present and future implications” policy argument to emphasize 
the potential impacts of the court’s decision on the future. In fact, 
an advocate in this situation may want to consider explaining how 
the decision in the present case could begin a slippery slope85 of 
increasingly bad consequences in the future. By way of example, 
let’s take another look at the Illinois v. Caballes case. 
Recall that in Caballes, the United States Supreme Court was 
confronted with the issue of whether a dog sniff by a police dog 
from outside of a vehicle constitutes an illegal search under the 
Fourth Amendment.86 Recall further that the defendant in this case 
had a “present and future implications” policy argument based on 
the value of privacy.87 In an effort to take advantage of the “fear of 
future loss” cognitive phenomenon, the attorney for the defendant 
could have stressed the possible future negative consequences that 
could flow from a decision allowing this type of police conduct. In 
fact, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg employed this exact strategy in 
                                                          
85 A “slippery slope” argument asserts that a particular decision in the 
present case will set a precedent that will lead to increasingly bad consequences 
in the future (i.e., a slippery slope toward undesirable results). See, e.g., 
Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (1985). For 
in-depth discussions of slippery slope arguments in the law, see generally, for 
example, id.; Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 
CALIF. L. REV. 1469 (1999); Mario J. Rizzo, The Camel’s Nose Is in the Tent: 
Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2003); Eugene 
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003). 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 71–79 (discussing Caballes v. Illinois, 
543 U.S. 405(2005)). 
87 See id. 
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her dissenting opinion in Caballes. In her effort to explain why the 
value of privacy dictated a result for the defendant, Justice 
Ginsburg emphasized the scary future that would result from a 
favorable decision for the prosecution: 
Today’s decision . . . clears the way for 
suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of 
parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. . . . 
Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for 
complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long 
traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to 
turn green.88 
This quote from Justice Ginsburg reflects an important 
advocacy strategy. In a policy argument that had implications for 
the present case, Justice Ginsburg nevertheless primarily focused 
on the future. Her argument was designed to tap into the human 
fear of future loss by stressing the negative consequences the case 
could spawn in all of our futures. 
 
B. Increase the Perception of the Probability of the 
Consequences 
 
The second group of advocacy strategies revolves around the 
assessment of probability. As we saw in Part I, all policy 
arguments focus on how the court’s decision will have 
consequences for a particular social value. And while the 
immediate consequences are certain in a “present and future 
implications” policy argument, the asserted consequences are only 
speculative in a “future implications only” policy argument. It 
necessarily follows, then, that proving the probability of the 
asserted consequences is integral to this kind of policy argument. 
What’s more, in the preceding section on the fear of future loss, we 
saw that even with “present and future implications” policy 
arguments, an advocate will often explore the possible additional 
“slippery slope” negative consequences that could flow from the 
court’s decision in the present case. In these situations too, then, 
proving the probability of the asserted consequences is integral to 
the argument. Thus, for both types of policy arguments, proving 
                                                          
88 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the probability of asserted consequences can be crucial. In this 
section, we will explore specific strategies by which an advocate 
can increase in the audience’s mind the perception that a certain 
consequence underlying a policy argument is more probable. 
 
1. Cite Non-Legal Materials That Help Prove the Probability 
of the Asserted Consequences 
 
The first strategy for improving the perceived probability of the 
consequences asserted in a policy argument is to cite non-legal 
materials that support the assertion. Professor Margolis wrote two 
articles about the strategy of citing non-legal materials for policy 
arguments in briefs.89 While Professor Margolis did not render this 
advice specifically in the context of proving probability, her 
advice, nevertheless, is particularly relevant here. According to 
Professor Margolis’ general advice, a legal advocate can increase 
the effectiveness of a policy argument by citing non-legal materials 
for factual assertions that underlie the argument.90 Examples of 
non-legal materials include such things as scientific studies, 
economic data, history scholarship, medical reports, social science 
studies, and news of current events.91 
Non-legal materials such as those listed above can often be 
used to prove the probability of a consequence underlying a policy 
argument. Consider, for example, our interspousal immunity 
hypothetical. As the defendant in that hypothetical, we argued that 
the court should bar a suit between divorced spouses for a tort 
committed during marriage because to hold otherwise would 
encourage divorce in the future as a way of getting around the 
interspousal immunity defense. This “future implications only” 
policy argument is based on the assertion that future injured 
spouses would opt to get divorced in order to be able to sue the 
other spouse for compensation. But that argument begs the 
question: what is the probability that a married person would 
                                                          
89 See Margolis, Beyond Brandeis, supra note 5, at 210–19; Margolis, 
Closing the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 79–83.  
90 Margolis, Beyond Brandeis, supra note 5, at 210–19; Margolis, Closing 
the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 79–83;  
91 Margolis, Beyond Brandeis, supra note 5, at 201 n.27; Margolis, Closing 
the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 81 n.117.  
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actually terminate his or her marriage merely for the right to 
receive compensation for injuries? In an effort to enhance the 
perceived probability of this consequence, we, as attorneys for the 
defendant, could cite sociological studies that show that financial 
issues and concerns are a leading cause of divorce among 
Americans.92 Such studies would help us demonstrate the 
likelihood that, given a choice, a significant percentage of future 
injured spouses would choose the option of divorce and financial 
recovery over the alternative option of marriage and 
uncompensated injury. 
Professor Margolis’ scholarship provides another example: 
[I]n a case in which the court is asked to impose tort 
liability on a mother for injury to a child caused by 
the mother’s negligent conduct during pregnancy, 
the mother may argue that a duty to a fetus would 
be unduly intrusive because it would affect every 
moment of a woman’s life, even before pregnancy 
(the policy argument).  As support, she may provide 
medical information . . . about the many ways a 
woman’s conduct before and during pregnancy, 
such as diet, physical activity and choice of work, 
could affect the health of a fetus.93 
Although Professor Margolis did not phrase it as such, this 
excerpt is an illustration of how an advocate can enhance the 
perceived probability of the consequences underlying a “present 
and future implications” policy argument. The policy argument is 
based on the value of privacy and the desire to be free from 
unwanted intrusion into one’s life. This argument can be 
characterized as a “present and future implications” policy 
argument because the value of privacy applies to the instant mother 
as well as future mothers. Professor Margolis’ policy argument, 
however, comports with our earlier advice and focuses primarily 
on the future “slippery slope” consequences that could result from 
                                                          
92 See, e.g., Kathy Chu, Many Marriages Today Are ‘Til Debt Do Us Part, 
USA TODAY (May 8, 2006) http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/ 
basics/2006-04-27-couples-cash-series_x.htm (discussing several surveys that 
show that financial issues play a large role in divorce). 
93 Margolis, Beyond Brandeis, supra note 5, at 213 (citing Chenault v. Huie, 
989 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 1999)). 
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a decision in the present case. In this context, Professor Margolis 
explains how citing medical reports can enhance the 
persuasiveness of this argument. Phrased in terms of our 
discussion, the use of such non-legal materials can help prove the 
likelihood (i.e., probability) that the court’s recognition of this new 
legal duty of the mother in the present case would lead to the 
asserted future negative consequences. 
A real-life example of the use of non-legal materials to prove 
the probability of a threatened consequence in a policy argument 
can be seen in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion in 
Smith v. United States94 Recall that the issue in Smith was whether 
the statutory phrase “uses . . . a firearm” in relation to a drug deal 
includes using a gun as an item of barter.95 In answering that 
question in the affirmative, Justice O’Connor relied on the policy 
argument that guns at drug deals—even guns intended as 
consideration—can lead to violence. To prove the probability of 
her assertion, Justice O’Connor cited The American Enterprise, a 
non-legal source: 
When Congress enacted the current version of [this 
statute], it was no doubt aware that drugs and guns 
are a dangerous combination. In 1989, 56 percent of 
all murders in New York City were drug related; 
during the same period, the figure for the Nation’s 
Capital was as high as 80 percent. The American 
Enterprise 100 (Jan.-Feb. 1991).96 
As these three illustrations demonstrate, one way a legal 
advocate can enhance the perceived probability of the threatened 
consequences underlying a policy argument is to cite non-legal 
sources that help demonstrate the likelihood of those 
consequences. Such use of non-legal materials can significantly 
strengthen a policy argument by proving to the reader that the 
threatened impact on future society is a real possibility. 
 
  
                                                          
94 508 U.S. 223 (1993). The Smith case was originally discussed at supra 
text accompanying notes 58–63. 
95 Smith, 508 U.S. at 225, 227 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1990)). 
96 Id. at 240. 
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2. Combine more extreme, less likely consequences with less 
extreme, more likely consequences: The Conjunction 
Fallacy 
 
Advocates will often want to include highly extreme and 
dramatic consequences in their future-oriented policy arguments. 
Unfortunately, as a general rule, the more extreme a consequence 
is, the less probable it seems. To overcome this dilemma, an 
advocate should consider combining the more dramatic 
consequence with a less dramatic, yet more likely, consequence. 
Cognitive studies in probability assessment show that most 
people will consider the occurrence of a highly unlikely 
circumstance to be more probable when it is linked to a more likely 
circumstance. This is a cognitive phenomenon known as the 
conjunction fallacy.97 The conjunction fallacy is best illustrated by 
a famous study by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.  In this 
study, participants were asked to read the following description of 
a person named Linda: 
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and 
very bright.  She majored in philosophy.  As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with the issues 
of discrimination and social justice, and also 
participated in antinuclear demonstrations.98 
The participants were then asked, 
Which alternative is more probable? 
1. Linda is a bank teller. 
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement.99 
Before you read on, take a minute and answer this question 
yourself. 
During the many times this study was repeated, between 
                                                          
97 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 156–65; John E. Fisk, 
Conjunction Fallacy, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS, supra note 83, at 23–42; 
MASSIMO PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: HOW MISTAKES OF 
REASON RULE OUR MINDS 64–73 (Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini & Keith 
Botsford trans., 1994). 
98 KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 156. 
99 Id. at 158. I describe here the short version of this study, which came after 
much longer versions. See id. at 156–58. 
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eighty-five and ninety percent of the participants consistently 
chose option 2 as being more probable.100 You may have even 
chosen option 2 yourself. Mathematically, however, option 1 is 
more probable because the probability of two events happening is 
always less than the probability of only one of the two happening. 
While it may seem likely based on her description that Linda is a 
feminist, it is much less likely that she is both a feminist and a 
bank teller than just a bank teller.101 This common miscalculation 
of probability is a manifestation of the conjunction fallacy. 
Because Linda being a “feminist” seems likely, the human mind 
automatically chooses the option containing that quality even 
though that quality is conjoined with a less likely circumstance 
(being a bank teller). Thus, the chance of Linda being a bank teller 
seems more likely when it is linked to a more probable 
circumstance.102 
Resourceful legal advocates can use this cognitive 
phenomenon to their advantage in policy-based persuasion. When 
explaining the potential negative consequences of a future-oriented 
policy argument, advocates should link more extreme 
consequences with less extreme consequences. This combination 
often will trigger the conjunction fallacy and cause the audience to 
view the extreme consequences as more probable than those 
consequences would seem if they were presented in isolation. We 
can see this strategy in action in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in the 
Illinois v. Caballes case. Recall that in arguing in favor of privacy 
rights and against the majority’s decision to allow police to use 
drug-sniffing dogs on the outside of an automobile without 
                                                          
100 Id. at 158. 
101 Professor Kahneman explains it this way: 
Think in terms of Venn diagrams. The set of feminist bank 
tellers is wholly included in the set of bank tellers, as every 
feminist bank teller is a bank teller. Therefore the probability 
that Linda is a feminist bank teller must be lower than the 
probability of her being a bank teller. 
Id. at 157. 
102 See, e.g., id. at 159; PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 97, at 71–73; 
Fisk, supra note 97, at 27. 
103 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This quote was 
discussed in context. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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suspicion of the driver’s drug possession, Justice Ginsburg warned 
of slippery-slope consequences that could follow from the 
majority’s decision: 
Today’s decision . . . clears the way for 
suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of 
parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. . . .  
Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for 
complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long 
traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to 
turn green.103 
Whether Justice Ginsburg did it purposefully or not, her 
compelling statement gets much of its power from the conjunction 
fallacy. The predication that police with dogs will patrol traffic 
lights after the Caballes decision would seem too extreme and 
improbable if it was presented in isolation. However, by 
combining it with the more likely consequence of police using 
dogs in parking lots, Justice Ginsburg’s statement triggers the 
conjunction fallacy and, thereby, makes the more extreme 
consequence seem more probable. 
 
3. Provide vivid and easily imaginable examples of future 
consequences: The Availability Heuristic 
 
The last probability strategy we will discuss involves a 
cognitive phenomenon called the availability heuristic. According 
to the availability heuristic, people have a tendency in evaluating 
probability to view events or circumstances that they can readily 
imagine from their past experiences as being more probable than 
events and circumstances that have less relevance to their past 
experiences.104 “According to this heuristic principle, one basis for 
the judgment of the likelihood of an uncertain outcome is cognitive 
availability; that is, the ease with which this outcome can be 
pictured or constructed. The more available an outcome is, the 
                                                          
 
104 See generally, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 129–45 (discussing the 
ground-breaking work first published in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 207 (1973)); Rolf Reber, Availability, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS, supra 
note 83, at 147–63. 
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more likely it is perceived to be.”105 In short, the availability 
heuristic is the process of judging probability by “the ease with 
which instances come to mind.”106 
Legal advocates can take advantage of the availability heuristic 
by including vivid, easily-imaginable examples when describing 
the future consequences underlying a policy argument. We can see 
this strategy also at work in the quote from Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in the Caballes case discussed in the prior section. Note 
that both of the warned consequences—dog patrols in parking lots 
and dog patrols at traffic lights—are vivid and easily imaginable 
because we all encounter these locations on a regular basis. The 
ease with which these locations come to mind enhances the 
perceived probability of these consequences becoming a reality. 
Justice Ginsburg’s argument, by contrast, would not have been as 
persuasive had she warned of dog patrols in less common—and, 
therefore, less cognitively available—locations, such as the 
holding deck of an automobile ferry or the police automobile 
impound lot.107   
 
C. Increase the Perception of the Importance of the 
Consequences 
 
In Part I, we saw that policy arguments are based on an appeal 
to a judge’s values. It necessarily follows then that the strength of a 
policy argument depends largely on how important the judge 
considers the value implicated by the argument. We also saw that 
most questions of law implicate policy considerations on both 
sides of the issue and that the more important value according to 
the judge’s personal hierarchy of values will generally control the 
decision to the sacrifice of the competing value or values. Thus, 
the cognitive processes for assessing importance, and specifically 
                                                          
105 Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the 
Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of 
Imagery, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 98, 98 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (emphasis added). 
106 KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 129, 459 (quoting Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 104). 
107 Granted, these examples also would be less effective because they would 
potentially affect fewer people. 
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the cognitive processes for assessing the importance of a value, are 
critical to policy-based persuasion. In this section we will explore 
strategies by which a legal advocate can enhance in the judge’s 
mind the perceived importance of a value implicated by a policy 
argument. 
It is important to note that some social values can be ranked 
inalterably high or low in a judge’s hierarchy of values and that 
legal advocates can do very little to influence such entrenched 
values.  Furthermore, some commonly recurring legal issues—like 
constitutional issues—implicate the same competing values—such 
as crime control versus privacy, or public safety versus gun rights.  
With regard to such recurring issues, most judges have already 
decided which of the competing values is more important to them 
personally, and there is very little a legal advocate can do to alter 
that hierarchy in a specific case. That said, there are many times 
when a legal advocate can favorably influence in a judge’s mind 
the perceived importance of a value underlying a policy argument. 
Many legal issues pit two or more values against each other that a 
judge has only rarely (if ever) compared in the past. In these 
circumstances, the judge must decide, without a preconceived 
ranking, which of the competing values is personally more 
important. And it is in these instances that an opportunity to 
persuade exists. 
For example, in our interspousal immunity hypothetical, a 
judge must choose between the value of protecting marriage as an 
institution and the values of citizen access to courts and 
compensation for injuries. Most judges have never thought about 
juxtaposing these values, much less have had to choose between 
them. Thus, a legal advocate on either side of this issue would have 
an opportunity to try to enhance in the judge’s mind the perceived 
importance of the value or values underlying the advocate’s 
argument over the competing value or values.  
 
1. State Policy Arguments in Terms of Avoiding a Societal Loss 
Rather Than in Terms of Acquiring a Societal Gain 
 
Earlier, we discussed the fact that policy arguments can be 
viewed either as arguments designed to achieve a societal gain or 
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as arguments designed to avoid a societal loss.108 Despite these two 
possible approaches, I have consistently used the terminology of 
the latter in this Part, explaining the various advocacy strategies we 
have covered thus far in terms of avoiding loss. I have taken this 
approach because several cognitive phenomena, when considered 
together, suggest that policy arguments are more persuasive if they 
are phrased in terms of avoiding a loss as opposed to acquiring a 
gain. 
Here is a description of the relevant cognitive phenomena: 
 
 Loss Aversion: Loss aversion refers to the well-documented 
tendency of people to be more motivated by the fear of loss 
than they are by the prospect of gain.109 Consider this simple 
but popular example: “For most people, the fear of losing $100 
is more intense than the hope of gaining $150.”110 
 
 The Endowment Effect: The endowment effect is related to loss 
aversion. This term refers to the tendency of people to 
experience more pain in giving up something they possess than 
the pleasure they would experience in acquiring the same 
thing.111 Professor Dobelli offers this example in the context of 
commodities: “We consider things to be more valuable the 
moment we own them. In other words, if we are selling 
something, we charge more for it than what we ourselves 
would be willing to spend.”112 
 
 Negativity Bias: Negativity bias refers to the tendency of 
people to be more impacted by negative experiences and 
information than they are by positive experiences and 
                                                          
108 See supra Part III.A. 
109 See, e.g., DOBELLI, supra note 81, at 95–97, 327–28 (citing the “original 
research that brought the loss aversion to light: Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)); KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 283–82, 300–09. 
110 KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 284. 
111 See, e.g., id. at 289–99 (crediting Richard Thaler for the term endowment 
effect); DOBELLI, supra note 81, at 67–69. 
112 DOBELLI, supra note 81, at 67. 
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information.113 
 
The combination of these three phenomena strongly suggests 
that legal advocates should phrase their policy arguments in terms 
of avoiding loss. While loss aversion suggests this strategy most 
directly, the endowment effect and negativity bias confirm this 
advice. Any future negative consequences resulting from a court’s 
decision will require society to give up an existing asset: a positive 
or neutral state of existence. Conversely, future positive 
consequences represent the prospect of a societal gain. Under the 
endowment effect, the fear of giving up a societal asset is more 
powerful and motivating than the pleasure associated with 
acquiring a new societal asset.  What’s more, any discussion about 
avoiding a future loss is, by definition, a discussion phrased in the 
negative, whereas the discussion of a societal gain is necessarily 
positive. Negativity bias indicates that a discussion phrased in the 
negative is more influential and memorable than a discussion 
phrased in the positive. 
Set out below is a list of the policy issues we have discussed so 
far in this article. For each issue, I explain how the policy 
argument in question can be phrased as avoiding a societal loss 
rather than as acquiring a societal gain. 
 
 The Interspousal Immunity Hypothetical (from the defendant’s 
perspective):114 State the argument in terms of avoiding the 
encouragement of divorce on a societal scale (avoiding a 
societal loss), rather than in terms of protecting the institution 
of marriage (acquiring a societal gain). 
 
 The Interspousal Immunity Hypothetical (from the plaintiff’s 
perspective):115 State the argument in terms of avoiding the 
infringement or diminishment of the rights to court access and 
compensation, rather than as protecting those rights. 
                                                          
113 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 82, at 302. See generally Roy F. 
Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323 
(2001); Paul Rozin & Edward B. Royzman, Negativity Bias, Negativity 
Dominance, and Contagion, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 296 (2001). 
114 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
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 Klinger v Adams County School District and the definition of 
“expenses”:116 State the argument in terms of discouraging or 
deterring teachers from giving late notices of termination, 
rather than in terms of encouraging teachers to give timely 
notices.  State as avoiding a reduction in the quality of 
education, rather than as protecting the quality of education. 
 
 Smith v. United States and “using a firearm”:117 State the 
argument in terms of discouraging the taking of firearms to 
drug transactions, rather than in terms of encouraging drug 
dealers to leave their guns at home.  State as avoiding danger 
and violence, rather than as advancing public safety.  (It is 
interesting to note that Justice O’Connor, who wrote the 
majority opinion in Smith, referred to “danger” and “violence” 
four times in the opinion, but made no reference to “safety” or 
any variation of the word “safe.”118) 
 
 The “closing the floodgates” example:119 State the argument in 
terms of avoiding the “flood” of litigation, rather than as 
protecting the resources and efficiency of the court system. 
 
 Ahtna Tene Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game and “the 
right to attorney’s fees”:120 State the argument in terms of 
avoiding “fundamental unfairness,” rather than as advancing or 
promoting fairness. 
 
 Illinois v. Caballes and the “suspicionless dog sniff”:121 State 
the argument in terms of avoiding an infringement on privacy 
rights, rather than as securing privacy rights. 
 
As these illustrations demonstrate, most policy arguments can 
                                                          
116 See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
117 See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
118 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 passim (2003). 
119 See discussion supra Part II.A.4. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
121 See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
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be phrased in terms of either avoiding a loss or acquiring a gain. 
The cognitive phenomena discussed above suggest that legal 
advocates should choose the former over the latter. 
 
2. Cite Non-Legal Materials That Help Prove the Importance 
of the Implicated Value 
 
In the section on probability assessment, we discussed the 
strategy of an advocate citing non-legal sources to enhance the 
perceived probability of a future consequence underlying a policy 
argument.122 Interestingly, non-legal sources can also be used to 
enhance the perceived importance of a value implicated by a 
policy argument. Consider again the interspousal immunity 
example. Earlier we discussed the strategy of an advocate for the 
defense citing non-legal sources to help establish the likelihood 
(i.e., probability) that some injured spouses, given the opportunity, 
would choose to divorce their mates in order to get around the 
interspousal immunity defense. Non-legal sources could also be 
used by the defense to enhance the importance of the implicated 
value: the institution of marriage. An advocate, for example, could 
cite social science studies that demonstrate the benefits of marriage 
to society and the negative effects of divorce, both on the children 
of a marriage and on society in general.123 Citing to such materials 
could help elevate the importance of marriage within the value 
hierarchy of the judge deciding this issue. Thus, in considering the 
use of non-legal materials, a legal advocate should realize that such 
materials can be used in two completely different capacities in a 
policy argument: (1) to help prove the probability of the asserted 
consequences of the policy argument, as we saw earlier in this 
article, and (2) to help enhance the perceived importance of the 
value implicated by the policy argument, as we can see in this 
section. 
 
  
                                                          
122 See supra Part III.B.1. 
123 See, e.g., Hyun Sik Kim, Consequences of Parental Divorce for Child 
Development, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 487 (2011). 
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3. Cite Cases from Other Contexts That Help Prove the 
Importance of the Implicated Value 
 
In addition to citing non-legal materials to prove the 
importance of a value implicated in a policy argument, an advocate 
can also cite case law for this purpose.124 That is, an advocate can 
cite case law—either from another jurisdiction or from within the 
same jurisdiction but in a different context—that has previously 
recognized the importance of the value implicated in the 
advocate’s policy argument. Using case law in this manner can 
help the advocate enhance the perceived importance of the value in 
question by demonstrating that courts have relied on that value in 
resolving policy questions in the past. 
We can see an illustration of this strategy in the case of 
Maryland v. Blackman.125 One of the issues in Blackman was 
whether a person has the right to use violence to resist an illegal 
frisk by police officers.126 In deciding this issue, the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals relied on the policy argument that in 
order to secure the safety of peace officers, the law should 
discourage citizens from engaging in violent self-help, even if they 
are being wronged by the police.127 In support of this policy 
rationale, the court cited a prior case—Jupiter v. Maryland128 —
that recognized the policy against violent self-help in a completely 
different context.  In the Jupiter case, the Maryland Supreme Court 
had articulated a policy against violent self-help in affirming the 
robbery conviction of a man who engaged in self-help by using a 
shotgun to force a store employee to sell the man beer.129 Although 
the Jupiter case recognized the policy against violent self-help in a 
completely different setting, the Blackman court cited Jupiter as 
support for its policy conclusion: 
Close questions as to whether an officer possesses 
articulable suspicion must be resolved in the 
                                                          
124 Professor Margolis briefly discusses this strategy.  See Margolis, Closing 
the Floodgates, supra note 2, at 80–81. 
125 617 A.2d 619 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). 
126 Id. at 630–31. 
127 Id. at 630. 
128 616 A.2d 412 (Md. 1992). 
129 Id. at 417. 
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courtroom and not fought out on the streets.  Albeit 
uttered in the different context of not permitting a 
“claim of right” to be asserted as a defense to 
robbery, the words of Judge Rodowsky in Jupiter v. 
State, 328 Md. 635, 616 A.2d 412 (1992), well 
express our disdain for permitting self-help by way 
of force and violence, “There are strong public 
policy reasons why self-help, involving the use of 
force against a person, should not be condoned.”130 
As this quote illustrates, the Blackman court cited a case 
decided in a completely different context to enhance the perceived 
importance of the value underlying its policy rationale. That is, the 
author of the Blackman opinion used the Jupiter case not as 
authority on the substantive issue before the court, but as authority 
for the importance of the implicated value itself. Advocates should 
take notice of the strategy used by the court in Blackman and 
consider using case law from a different context (or from the same 
context in a different jurisdiction) to enhance the importance of the 
value underlying a policy argument in a brief. 
 
4. Consider Using a Thematic Literary Reference. 
 
In my Advanced Legal Writing textbook, I explore the 
rhetorical functions of thematic literary references in persuasive 
legal writing.131 In that discussion, I specifically examine how a 
thematic literary reference can be used by a legal advocate to 
enhance the importance of a value implicated in a legal 
argument.132 That discussion has relevance here in our exploration 
of strategies for increasing the perceived importance of a value in 
the context of policy-based persuasion. 
As I define it in my book, a thematic literary reference occurs 
when “a persuasive writer, in making an argument, includes a 
reference to a literary work the theme of which supports the 
writer’s argument.”133 Much scholarship has been produced in the 
                                                          
130 Blackman, 617 A.2d at 630. 
131
 See SMITH, supra note 6, at 285–97. 
132 Id. at 291–95. 
133 Id. at 285. 
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field of cognitive science that demonstrates that the reading of 
literary works helps shape a person’s values and morals.134  
According to this scholarship, when people read literary works, 
they are allowed to observe and vicariously experience the 
consequences of certain types of behavior and, by so doing, 
develop and refine their values systems.135 As Mark Johnson put it, 
“Fictional narratives provide us with rich, humanly realistic 
experimental settings in which we can make our own moral 
explorations.”136 
Here is my prior explanation of how a thematic literary 
reference can enhance the perceived importance of a value 
implicated in a legal argument: 
[O]ne strategy in persuasion is to attempt to elevate 
in the mind of the decision-maker the importance of 
the value supporting an advocate’s position over the 
competing values. If literary works helped to form 
the favorable value in the mind of the decision-
maker in the first place, then an allusion to one of 
these literary works can serve to activate and 
enhance the importance of that value among and in 
relation to the various other values in the decision-
maker’s value system. Referring to a literary work 
that is part of the decision-maker’s mental 
storehouse of literary texts allows the decision-
maker to “relive” the original experience of reading 
that text. As Professor Johnson explained above, the 
decision-maker’s original reading of the text helped 
to form the value in question by allowing him or her 
to see the implications and consequences of that 
value within the “experimental setting” of literary 
fiction. A later allusion to that text in a persuasive 
document allows the decision-maker to re-
experience that imaginary journey of discovery and 
to again appreciate the importance of the value or 
                                                          
134 See, e.g., id. at 293 (discussing MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: 
IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS (1994)). 
135 See, e.g., id. 
136 Id. (quoting JOHNSON, supra note 134, at 198). 
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lesson learned on that journey.  Thus, for issues that 
implicate competing yet equally ranked values in 
the mind of the decision-maker, the incorporation of 
a reference to a literary work that aided in the 
original formation of one of those values has the 
power to enhance the importance of that value over 
the competing values. Consequently, that value will 
likely play a greater role in the ultimate decision by 
the decision-maker.137 
We can see an example of the use of a thematic literary 
reference in a policy argument in Justice William Brennan’s 
dissent in the case of Florida v. Riley.138 In Riley, the majority of 
the United States Supreme Court upheld warrantless police 
helicopter surveillance from an altitude of 400 feet.139 In his 
dissent, Justice Brennan made a policy argument based on the 
value of privacy and offered the following thematic reference to 
George Orwell’s novel, 1984: 
The Fourth Amendment demands that we temper 
our efforts to apprehend criminals with a concern 
for the impact on our fundamental liberties of the 
methods we use. I hope it will be a matter of 
concern to my colleagues that the police 
surveillance methods they would sanction were 
among those described 40 years ago in George 
Orwell’s dread vision of life in the 1980’s: 
The black-mustachio’d face gazed 
down from every commanding 
corner. There was one on the house 
front immediately opposite. BIG 
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, 
the caption said. . . . In the far 
distance a helicopter skimmed down 
between the roofs, hovered for an 
instant like a bluebottle, and darted 
away again with a curving flight. It 
                                                          
137 Id. at 294. 
138 488 U.S. 445, 456–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
139 Id. at 450–52 (majority opinion). 
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was the Police Patrol, snooping into 
people’s windows.  
Nineteen Eighty-Four 4 (1949). 
Who can read this passage without a 
shudder, and without the instinctive reaction that it 
depicts life in some country other than ours? I 
respectfully dissent.140 
For those who read 1984, the novel likely played a role in the 
formation and solidification of the value of privacy from 
governmental intrusion. Thus, Justice Brennan’s literary allusion to 
this work was designed to enhance in the minds of his readers the 
perceived importance of the value of privacy. This was done in an 
effort to prove that the majority reached the wrong result by 
sacrificing the value of privacy in the name of the competing social 
value of crime prevention. 
As we can see from this example, a thematic literary reference 
can add significant force to an argument based on an appeal to 
values. Because all policy arguments, by definition, are based on 
an appeal to values, this strategy is available to legal advocates in 
this context. For more information on how specifically to construct 
a thematic literary reference, I encourage you to read my lengthy 
treatment of this topic in my textbook.141 
 
D. Increase the Memorability of the Policy Argument 
 
The final cognitive process relevant to policy-based persuasion 
is memorability. A policy argument in a brief is persuasive only if 
the reader can remember the argument after he or she puts the brief 
down. Thus, the memorability of the argument is also critical in 
policy-based persuasion. 
For our purposes, the most important cognitive phenomenon 
regarding memorability is the Van Restorff Effect. According to the 
Van Restorff Effect, people remember things that are highlighted 
or that otherwise stand out from their surroundings.142 While that 
                                                          
140 Id. at 466–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141 See SMITH, supra note 6, at 285–97. 
142 See, e.g., R. Reed Hunt, The Subtlety of Distinctiveness: What von 
Restorff Really Did, 2 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 105 (1995). 
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concept seems like common sense, cognitive research confirms it.  
Thus, the final general strategy for improving a policy argument in 
a brief is to make it stand out from the rest of the brief. 
One way to make a policy argument stand out in a brief is to 
give the argument its own section in the brief, together with its 
own point heading.143 The literature on brief writing provides 
conflicting advice on whether a policy argument in a legal brief 
should be interwoven with another argument or whether it should 
be given its own section and point heading.144 From a 
memorability standpoint, however, the Van Restorff Effect 
strongly suggests that a policy argument in a brief should be 
presented prominently, not subtlely.145  
The second way to draw attention to a policy argument is to 
incorporate poetic language. Cognitive scientists have confirmed 
what classical rhetoricians have long known: ideas expressed with 
rhetorical flair are more memorable than ideas expressed in 
common prose.146 
Many rhetorical devices, called figures of speech, have been 
identified as giving language a poetic quality.147 Some of these 
figures of speech are familiar to most of us, like metaphor, simile, 
and alliteration. Others are less known and can have bizarre-
                                                          
143 See, e.g., Robert F. Lorch, Jr., Text-Signaling Devices and Their Effects 
on Reading and Memory Processes, 1 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 209 (1989). 
144 Compare, e.g., CAROLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY: 
BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 111 (3d ed. 2003) (“The advocate should 
not separate the equity and policy arguments from the arguments of fact and 
law.”), and MICHAEL R. FONTHAM ET AL., PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND ORAL 
ADVOCACY IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 92 (2002) (“You should use 
[policy arguments] to reinforce the argument rather than as main points.”), with 
BRADLEY G. CLARY ET AL., ADVOCACY ON APPEAL 75 (3d ed. 2008) (“In terms 
of the organization of your argument, a discussion of these public policy 
considerations may fit after you have laid out your legal analysis and may 
warrant one or several separate argument subheadings.”). 
145 See, e.g., Lorch, supra note 143. 
146 For the cognitive science perspective, see for example Matthew S. 
McGlone & Jessica Tofighbakhsh, Birds of a Feather Flock Conjointly (?): 
Rhyme as Reason in Aphorisms, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 424 (2000). For a classical 
rhetoric perspective, see for example SMITH, supra note 6, at 193–94 (citing 
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE (Lane Cooper trans., 1932)). 
147 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 6, at 193–339. 
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sounding names, like metonymy and epistrophe.148 A complete list 
of rhetorical figures of speech is beyond the coverage of this 
article.  For those interested in a comprehensive discussion of how 
to incorporate figures of speech in persuasive legal writing, I 
encourage you to review Chapters 9–15 of my textbook, Advanced 
Legal Writing.149 Here, however, I will provide a couple of simple 
examples in the context of policy persuasion. 
Recall the Supreme Court case of Smith v. United States, in 
which Justice O’Connor wrote a majority opinion holding that the 
phrase “uses . . . a firearm” in relation to a drug transaction 
includes using a firearm as an item of trade for drugs.150 Recall 
further that Justice O’Connor supported this conclusion with the 
policy argument that firearms are dangerous and pose a threat to 
safety even if they are present as only items of barter. Justice 
O’Connor punctuated this argument with this artful use of 
alliteration: “[A]s experience demonstrates, [a gun] can be 
converted instantaneously from currency to cannon.”151 The use of 
this poetic language was not accidental.  Her elegant use of 
alliteration helped Justice O’Connor etch her policy argument in 
the mind of her reader. 
As another example, consider this clever use of simile in a per 
curiam decision by the Supreme Court while arguing the policy of 
free expression: 
 
“Being free to engage in unlimited political 
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is 
like being free to drive an automobile as far and as 
often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”152 
 
In another example, Judge Kenneth Hall of the Fourth Circuit 
                                                          
148 Mytonymy “involves referring to a thing, not by its literal name, but by a 
word suggestive of or associated with it.” Id. at 325. Epistrophe occurs when 
“the writer uses the same word or group of words at the end of successive 
clauses.” Id. at 330. 
149 Id. at 193–339. 
150 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238–41 (1993) (originally 
discussed at supra Part II.A.3). 
151 Id. at 240 (emphasis added). 
152 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1976) (per curiam). 
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crafted an artistic metaphor to highlight his argument for a broad 
definition of mail fraud: 
 
“[A] civil RICO suit may be maintained, not only in 
mail fraud cases where the deceitful mailing is the 
blade rushing down toward the guillotine victim, 
but also in cases involving more grandiose schemes 
to cheat, where the mail is but part of the frame that 
holds the blade.”153 
 
And here is an alliterative example from Supreme Court Justice 
Frank Murphy as he expresses the Court’s commitment to the 
policies underlying federal income tax law and the Court’s holding 
that embezzled funds are not subject to income tax: 
 
“Moral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability.”154 
 
In all of these examples, the authors of the opinions made their 
policy arguments more memorable by using a figure of speech to 
highlight a key component of the argument. As a final example, we 
return again to where we started: our interspousal immunity 
hypothetical. In that scenario we, as attorneys for the defendant, 
argued that a suit between divorced spouses for a tort committed 
during marriage should be barred because to hold otherwise would 
encourage divorce as a means of getting around the interspousal 
immunity defense. As we discussed earlier, this policy argument is 
based on the value of marriage as a social institution and the 
corresponding fear of widespread divorce. The main thrust of the 
argument is that the preservation of marriage as a social institution 
is more important than an individual’s right to sue for personal 
injuries.  To highlight this argument, we could perhaps employ the 
rhetorical device of alliterative antithesis, which creates rhythmic 
phrasing by combining alliteration with the parallel grammatical 
                                                          
153 Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1996). 
“RICO” refers to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§  1961–68 (2012). 
154 Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946). 
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structure of antithesis:155 
 
A citizen’s right to sue is outweighed by the 
commonwealth’s commitment to marriage. 
 
A statement such as this—that is, a statement that summarizes 
an important component of our policy argument using a poetic 
figure of speech—would help us as brief writers to highlight that 
point within our brief. And highlighting this point, according to the 
Van Restorff Effect, would help make the argument more 
memorable to our reader. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Policy arguments are indispensable to effective written legal 
advocacy. As this article demonstrates, social science scholarship 
offers many insights into human behavior that can assist legal 
advocates in improving the persuasiveness of their policy 
arguments. 
As an initial matter, we explored the general characteristics of 
a policy argument in terms of sociological and cognitive principles 
and examined the unique role that such arguments play in legal 
advocacy. We also saw that from a cognitive perspective, policy 
arguments in legal advocacy can be broken down into two broad 
categories: (1) policy arguments that focus on only the future 
societal consequences of the court’s decision in the present case, 
and (2) policy arguments that focus on both the present and the 
future societal consequences of the court’s decision in the present 
                                                          
155 SMITH, supra note 6, at 334–35. 
[A]ntithesis is a stylistic device by which a writer sets out two 
contrasting statements in close proximity to each other and 
uses similar language and parallel grammatical structure for 
both statements. Alliteration . . . occurs when a writer 
intentionally uses the same letter or letter sound at the 
beginning of two or more words in a single sentence or in 
group of related sentences. The combination of these two 
devices results in alliterative antithesis. 
Id. For detailed instructions on how to craft an original passage of alliterative 
antithesis, see id. at 334–39. 
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case. 
In the last section, we explored four general cognitive 
strategies advocates can use to improve the persuasiveness of their 
policy arguments. The latter three of these four strategies included 
specific sub-strategies that offer detailed guidelines for brief 
writers. Here is a summarizing outline of the strategies we 
explored: 
 
1. Take advantage of the fear of future loss – From a 
cognitive standpoint, policy arguments that fall under the 
first category—i.e., policy arguments that focus primarily 
on future potential consequences—are generally more 
persuasive than policy arguments that fall under the second 
category—i.e., policy arguments that focus on both 
immediate and future consequences. The cognitive 
phenomena underlying this observation include the 
uncertainty effect, status quo bias, and the mere exposure 
effect. In view of these phenomena, advocates, in making 
policy arguments, should stress the potential future impact 
of the court’s decision on society over the more immediate 
impact. 
 
2. Increase the perceived probability of the consequences 
underlying a policy argument – Because future-oriented 
policy arguments focus on the potential future 
consequences of a court’s decision in the present case, the 
strength of such arguments depends largely on how 
probable the foretold consequences seem in the mind of the 
judge. Strategies for increasing the perceived probability of 
the foretold consequences include the following: 
 Cite non-legal materials that help prove the 
probability of the asserted consequences. 
 Take advantage of the conjunction fallacy 
by combining more extreme consequences 
with less extreme, more likely 
consequences. 
 Account for the availability heuristic by 
providing vivid and easily imaginable 
examples of the asserted consequences. 
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3. Increase the perceived importance of the consequences 
underlying a policy argument – The strength of a policy 
argument also depends largely on the importance the 
deciding judge gives to the threatened consequences and 
the social values implicated by those consequences. 
Strategies for increasing the perceived importance of the 
consequences underlying a policy argument include the 
following: 
 Take advantage of a number of related 
cognitive phenomena—including loss 
aversion, the endowment effect, and 
negativity bias—by stating policy arguments 
in terms of avoiding a societal loss rather 
than in terms of acquiring a societal gain. 
 Cite non-legal materials that help prove the 
importance of the asserted consequences and 
the attendant social values.  As we saw, non-
legal materials can be used in two 
completely different capacities in a policy 
argument: (1) to help prove the probability 
of the asserted consequences of the policy 
argument, as indicated in item 2 above; and 
(2) to help enhance the perceived 
importance of the value implicated by the 
policy argument, as indicated here. 
 Cite cases from other contexts that help 
prove the importance of the asserted 
consequences and the attendant social 
values. 
 Consider using a thematic literary reference. 
 
4. Increase the memorability of a policy argument – To be 
persuasive, a policy argument must be remembered by the 
reader after the reader puts the advocate’s brief down.  
Strategies for increasing the memorability of a policy 
argument include the following: 
 Give a policy argument in a brief its own 
section and point heading. 
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 Use poetic language—i.e., a rhetorical figure 
of speech—to highlight an important 
component of a policy argument. 
 
While this article explores the implications of social science 
theory on policy-based persuasion, it is intended only as a first 
step. Many additional revelations about human cognition and 
social interaction can be applied to this topic. While the literature 
on written legal advocacy has been slow to address in any serious 
way the skill of policy-based persuasion, I predict this topic will 
garner more attention in the future. Many legal issues, particularly 
issues on appeal, come down to a choice between competing 
policy considerations. As a consequence, the future of advocacy 
pedagogy will undoubtedly include further exploration into the 
cognitive and sociological dimensions of policy-based decision-
making. 
